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I. INTRODUCTION
In critical-embedded real-time systems [34] software con-
tinues to be in charge of providing most innovative services,
making it instrumental in increasing products’ competitive
edge in the market [23]. Software is also increasingly driving
the decision making process over a huge amounts of data of
diverse types, which not only increases its complexity but
also complicates timing validation and verification (V&V).
The latter focus on providing evidence that system functions
perform timely: to that end, timing analysis methods are
used to estimate the worst-case execution time (WCET) of
tasks. WCET estimates must be reliable, according to the
level of confidence defined in the relevant safety standards,
and as tight as possible, to minimize the provisioning of
hardware resources. Timing V&V is further challenged by
the use of performance-accelerating hardware (e.g., caches)
to provide the unprecedented rise in performance needs for
critical software’s, expected to be as high as 100x in the next
years in the automotive domain [1].
Increased hardware and software complexity reduces the
confidence that can be placed on WCET estimates derived by
measurement-based timing analysis (MBTA), the most used
timing analysis technique in critical real-time embedded sys-
tems [44]. In particular, increased effort is needed on the user
to concoct stressing execution scenarios during the (analysis-
time) test campaign as a means to capture bad scenarios that
can arise during system operation [18].
Complex hardware/software platforms exacerbate the inher-
ent variability in the execution time of a program, leading to
timing distributions with arbitrary variance and shape. This has
motivated the use of statistical techniques to derive bounds to
execution time distributions. In particular Measurement-based
probabilistic timing analysis (MBPTA) [3], [8], matured in
recent years, delivers a probabilistic WCET (pWCET) function
that upper-bounds the (probabilistic) execution time distribu-
tion of the program (pETd) at any exceedance probability, see
Figure 2. MBPTA has been successfully applied to industrial
case studies [43] and its impact on certification has been
addressed [42].
MBPTA has been complemented with solutions that inject
randomization in program’s timing behavior to relieve the user
from controlling those jittery resources affecting the execution
time variability of a program. Randomization makes that all
potential behaviors that a given jittery resource (e.g. caches)
can exhibit, are naturally (and randomly) explored in every
new test, enabling the derivation of probabilistic guarantees.
In the case of caches, cache-placement randomisation breaks
the dependence between memory mapping and cache location,
typical of conventional modulo-placement caches. As will be
detailed later, this prevents incremental software integration
from having any repercussion on cache behavior, thus not
requiring the end user to exercise any control over mem-
ory mapping [12]. Randomization has been implemented at
hardware level (e.g. random arbitration policies and random
placement/replacement techniques) that are now part of a
commercial product for the space domain [6]; and with
software-only techniques (e.g. compiler level) [26]. We focus
on hardware-randomized cache placement.
To properly account for the timing behavior of caches – one
of the on-chip processor resources with the highest impact on
average and worst-case performance – timing V&V requires
capturing Conflictive Cache Placements (CCP) during the test
campaign. Under a CCP the number of addresses mapped to
a cache set exceeds its associativity W . Having W + 1 or
more addresses mapped to the same cache set will cause a
notable increase in the number of misses and, eventually, in
the execution time [2]. A concern for timing V&V arises when
the CCP occur with a sufficiently high probability, deemed
relevant by the corresponding safety standard, but low enough
not to be observed in the measurements at analysis time [2],
[31], [39]. For instance, for a program accessing 5 addresses,
the probability that all of them are randomly mapped to the
same set in a 32-set 4-way cache is 10−6≈32/325 = (1/32)4,
which is considered to be relevant for avionics and automotive
products1. With random cache placement, when R = 1, 000
runs are performed – a reference value typically used by
MBPTA – the probability that at least one run captures the
execution-time impact of the cache placement of interest (i.e.,
five addresses mapped to the same set) is very low (≈10−3),
and hence, highly unlikely to be captured by MBPTA. Thus,
MBPTA faces the challenge of deriving an R guaranteeing that
relevant CCPs of time-randomized caches (TRc) are captured
with sufficiently high probability.
High values of R increase the probabilistic coverage of
CCPs, but also increase the application costs of MBPTA,
drastically reducing its overall benefit/cost ratio. In this paper,
we provide means to quantify the probability (risk) of not
capturing CCPs, and the increased cost of performing more
1Depending on the criticality level, acceptable per-hour failure rate proba-
bilities range from 10−6 to 10−9.
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runs. This provides the system engineer a mechanism to take
an informed decision on the number of measurements to
collect, properly balancing the time/effort available for the
analysis, the criticality of the software being analyzed, and the
corresponding safety requirements in the reference application
domain.
We focus on the two TRc existing designs, namely, Ran-
dom Modulo (RM), already implemented on a commercially-
available processor [6] with competitive results in comparison
to standard (modulo placement) caches [22]; and hash-based
Random Placement2 (hRP) that provides lower performance
though it imposes fewer constraints in hardware designs, thus
offering a different and valuable tradeoff [27]. In particular,
the main contributions of this work are as follows:
We analyze RM and hRP to shed some light on how CCPs
emerge in a different manner under those designs. We show
that the particular set of W + 1 or more addresses that when
mapped to the same set cause a CCP are different under RM
and hRP. Further, both the miss counts and the number of
CCP decrease under RM, which in turn reduces the number of
runs required. This motivates the necessity of different design-
specific techniques to intercept CCPs.
We propose CCP-RM and CCP-hRP that identify the CCP
for a given sequence of addresses, along with their probability
and impact on execution time, for RM and hRP respectively.
For a given configurable coverage probability threshold Pcth,
CCP-RM and CCP-hRP determine whether CCP’s impact is
captured in the default R runs performed by MBPTA. Other-
wise, more runs need to be carried out until the probability of
not observing one of the random CCP is below Pcth.
We evaluate CCP-RM and CCP-hRP on a cycle-accurate
timing simulator where we provide evidence of their benefits
on reference EEMBC automotive benchmarks. The simulator
experimental setup allows building controlled scenarios in
which we can exhaustively derive all cache placements and
show how CCP-RM (CCP-hRP) capture the actual set of
conflictive cache placements. This information can be used
as evidence for certification.
We assess CCP-RM and CCP-hRP on a real setup with a
case study, representative of the railway domain, running on
real implementations of RM and hRP on an FPGA board.
Results show that CCP-RM and CCP-hRP identify CCP with
limited burden on the user side (in terms of effort and time)
and derive the number of observations R′ that needs to be
collected to ensure that the probability of not capturing a
relevant CCP is below acceptable levels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents basic background on timing Validation and Verifi-
cation. Section III shows the main differences in terms of
CCP between hRP and RM. Sections IV and V detail our
CCP-RM and CCP-hRP proposals respectively, which are then
thoroughly evaluated in Sections VI and VII, on simulated
2Whereas the CCP-hRP mechanism and its evaluation have been already
published in [33], the CCP-RM mechanism, the analysis of RM and hRP
caches and the comparison of CCP-RM and CCP-hRP are strictly novel
contributions.
and FPGA platforms respectively. Finally, Section VIII covers
the most relevant related works whereas Section IX draws the
conclusions we derive from this work.
II. TIMING V&V, CERTIFICATION, AND STANDARDS
Timing Faults and Safety Standards. A common miscon-
ception in real-time systems is that a program overrun (timing
fault) necessarily causes a failure at system level. In reality, a
safety process factors in the impact that timing faults can have
on the overall system failure rate. Taking as a reference the
ISO26262 [24] standard in the automotive domain, the safety
life cycle defines safety goals (and their associated Automotive
Safety Integrity Level or ASIL) for each system element. If
those goals are reached, the residual risk of failure is deemed
as sufficiently low. The safety process also defines the safety
requirements on the hardware/software to reach the safety
goal. Proper measures are put in place to reduce the probability
that a fault in a hardware/software element can contribute to
the violation of its safety requirements – and hence the safety
goal – beyond an established threshold. For instance, random
hardware residual faults are considered acceptable if their rate
is below a given threshold and the diagnosis coverage – i.e. the
mechanisms detecting whether this type of fault can occur for
a given hardware block – is below a given target. For instance,
for the highest safety level (ASIL-D) the maximum allowed
failure rate is 10−8 per hour of operation when the diagnosis
coverage reaches 99%.
MBTA and evidence for certification. For complex hard-
ware and software, industry will continue to use MBTA
as the main analysis approach. This has not only been
directly acknowledged by automotive representatives [38],
but also, in recent industrial works, OEM/Tier1 teams and
static timing analysis (STA) tool providers increasingly resort
to measurement-based analysis to derive timing bounds for
processor architectures like the NXP P4080 [14], and ARM-
based SABRE Lite multicore system [11]. The reason is that
STA does not scale to handle the complexity of hardware and
software: STA aims at delivering evidence for timing V&V
models building on formal proofs that are meant to show the
soundness of the application of the analysis steps. While this
can be agreed to be scientifically sound, the confidence on STA
results still builds on the fragile and increasingly unrealistic
assumption of correctness of the underlying timing model,
which is expected to faithfully represent the behavior of the
real hardware being analyzed. The extraordinary complexity
of multicore platforms and the lack of sufficient technical
details in manuals cause the above assumption to be poorly
sustainable in practice, which in turn drives the industrial
practice to build on empirical evidence (measurements) as
the main element to show adherence to timing requirements.
In this line, most recent industrial approaches to handle the
timing of complex hardware [5] build on requirements that,
for the same reasons above, can only be assessed empirically.
This includes, for instance, the identification of interference
channels, which necessarily requires an extensive set of tests
Fig. 1. Probability range of interest
showing the processor resources in which tasks affect each
other’s timing behavior.
Furthermore, empirical evidence and heuristics are widely
used in hardware testing processes. For instance, ISO26262
defines different failure rate thresholds for different ASIL
levels according to the diagnostic coverage w.r.t. residual faults
(see clause 9.4.3.6 in ISO26262 Part 5). Fault models used for
assessing diagnostic coverage are in many cases restricted to
models that can be tested at appropriate abstraction levels. For
instance, stuck-at faults can be easily assessed at gate-level,
where the model of the hardware is precise enough, and engi-
neers have full controllability and observability of the circuit.
In the absence of ‘complete’ fault models to assess diagnostic
coverage, heuristics are used to generate a sufficiently low
number of tests with sufficiently high diagnostic coverage.
For instance, tests are normally generated with Automatic
Test Pattern Generators (ATPG) [7], [16], which build upon
heuristics (including guided search algorithms). Target test
coverage can be as low as 90% even for the highest criticality
levels (ASIL-D in automotive), thus leaving up to 10% of the
design untested against relevant faults. Overall, evidence for
certification builds upon measurements obtained with heuris-
tics due to the inability to afford exhaustive explorations.
MBPTA. The quality of WCET estimates is hard to assess,
especially for increasingly complex systems. The main con-
cern in MBTA lies in the construction of tests cases for the test
campaign that exhaustively (and simultaneously) capture the
worst-case behavior of jittery resources (jres). MBPTA applies
to timing analysis the ISO26262’s philosophy to handle hard-
ware faults: MBPTA derives tasks’ probabilistic distributions,
representing the probability that one task execution overruns a
given budget, as shown in Figure 2. For example, assuming a
budget of 7 time units, the probability that a task exceeds
its deadline (potentially causing a timing failure) is below
10−10. By multiplying the target probability by the frequency
of execution of the analyzed task per hour, MBPTA derives
the probability of timing failures per hour of operation, hence
fitting ISO26262.
MBPTA controls the impact on execution time of jres during
the test campaign. It does so by either enforcing jres that
cause low execution-time variation to work on their worst
latency (so their impact on execution time is upperbounded
in analysis-time runs) or by randomizing the timing behavior
of those jres that cause high execution-time variation (such that
bad timing behavior is captured with a quantifiable increasing
probability as more measurements are taken). As a result,
the analysis time pETd (ApETd) is an upperbound of the
operation time pETd (OpETd) (see Figure 2). On the other
hand, MBPTA simplifies the process of collecting observations
during the test campaign by deploying statistical techniques
such as Extreme Value Theory [29] (EVT). EVT models
program’s execution time probability distribution based on
a limited number of measurements (e.g. 1000), see pWCET
distribution in Figure 2. Further, EVT transparently derives the
combined probability that the bad behavior of different jres
occur simultaneously in a single run, provided that the bad
behavior of each single jres has been captured in the collected
runs. As a consequence, triggering the bad timing of all jres
individually suffices for a trustworthy WCET estimation with
MBPTA. This is in contrast to MBTA that requires all bad
behavior to be triggered in a single run.
The quality of WCET estimates obtained with MBPTA de-
pends on the representativeness of the measurements collected
at analysis w.r.t. the timing behavior of the system during
operation. In analysis-time measurements, bad timing behavior
of each jres needs to be exercised and fed to EVT, which
is then responsible for modelling the combined behavior of
several jres. For low-variability jres, which are enforced to
work at their highest latency at analysis, a single measurement
is sufficient to capture bad behavior. For high-variance jres,
which are instead meant to be time-randomized, all relevant
(random) events need to be captured by carrying out enough
runs.
Relevant (random) events, see Figure 1, are all those
occurring with a probability above a threshold that relates
to the corresponding safety standard in the domain (e.g.
Prel = 10
−9). The probability of not observing a relevant
random event at analysis (Pnobs) is a function of the num-
ber of measurements taken (R) and the event probability
(Pnobs = (1− Pevent)R). See Table I for the definitions used
throughout the paper. For example, let us assume that R =
10,000 measurements are taken during the test campaign at
analysis. The events with per-run probability of occurrence
equal to Pevent may be not be properly covered (i.e. missed)
with negligible probability, Pcth, if (1−Pevent)10000 ≤ Pcth.
For instance, for Pcth = 10−7 events with a probability
Pevent ≥ 0.00162 are captured with a probability higher
than 1 − 10−7. To capture events with lower probabilities of
occurrence with enough confidence, more runs are needed.
III. UNDERSTANDING CCP UNDER RM AND HRP
For RM and hRP, the relevant random events to track are
the CCPs, corresponding to those random cache mappings that
cause the number of program addresses mapped to the same
set to exceed the cache associativity W [2]. Those addresses
compete for the same set, increasing the number of conflict
misses. Otherwise, i.e. when W or fewer addresses within a
loop are mapped to the same set, after some initial misses
due to random replacement, the addresses will eventually end
TABLE I
DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS PAPER.
Term Description
Pevent; Prel Probability of ‘event’ (e.g.CCP); Threshold probability sep-
arating relevant from non-relevant events
Pnobs; Pcth Probability of missing event at analysis; Coverage threshold
probability dictated by safety standard
P̃guilty Probability of the address of interest to be evicted
guilt Measure of the contribution of a given address to the
P̃guilty of the address of interest
K Cardinality of (number of addresses in) a combination
Qi = {AXj , ...} Sequence of accesses, A is the memory addresses, j the
number of times A has been referenced in the sequence
and X is the cache segment A belongs to
@(Qi) ; |@(Qi)| Set of unique addresses in Qi and Number of unique
addresses in it
memaddrX Any of the accesses in sequence to memory address
memaddr belonging to the segment X
U Number of unique addresses in a sequence
Xi Sequence of accesses between 2 accesses to the same
address
q No. of distinct addresses in a sequence Xi
s No. of distinct cache segments in a sequence Xi
m1(m2) Local variables used to compute Pguilt−seg (guilt)
R (R′ ) Number of measurements to collect determined by MBPTA
(CCP-aware mechanism: CCP-RM/CCP-hRP)
T Number of conflictive combinations
S; W Number of cache sets; Number of cache ways
Fig. 2. Randomization (and upperbounding) of jittery resources cause the
analysis time pETd (ApETd) to upperbound that at operation (OpETd).
Building on a sample (of for instance 1,000 elements) from ApETd, MBPTA
derives a probabilistic WCET distribution.
up fitting in their assigned cache set [2]. We define two dis-
tinct procedures, CCP-RM and CCP-RP, that derive the CCP
probability (i.e. Pevent) on RM and hRP caches respectively;
they also determine whether the probability (Pnobs) of not
observing CCP with the default number of measurements R
is below a given user-provided coverage threshold (Pcth). If
Pnobs > Pcth, CCP-RM and CCP-hRP request the user to
perform more runs R′ until Pnobs < Pcth, i.e. the probability
of not capturing CCP is below the user-defined threshold.
Hence, CCP-RM and CCP-hRP offer the user a mechanism to
balance testing time and providing evidence for certification
on timing budgets according to the target integrity (criticality)
level.
A. Time-Randomized Cache (TRc) Implementations
TRc breaks the dependence between address location in
memory and its cache set position. As a result, during the test
campaign, users do not need to control program’s code/data
memory placement – which is very sensitive to environmental
execution conditions that may change across software inte-
gration steps – but only need to adjust the number of mea-
surements to perform. Further, TRc favor incremental software
integration in that, unlike traditional caches, TRc cause that
changes in the memory layout of a module, occurring when
new modules are integrated, do not affect the set of CCPs.
Hence, while with traditional caches new memory layouts
invalidate the WCET estimates previously derived under a
different layout (software integration) [12], this is not the case
for TRc.
Hash-Based Random Placement (hRP) hashes addresses
with a random number to derive the cache set in which to place
the address. The random number is changed at the beginning of
each execution, such that addresses change placement across
sets. Under hRP any two addresses3 can be mapped to the
same set with a probability 1/S [=S/S2], where S is the
number of sets. The main disadvantage of hRP is that it
exhibits cache conflicts even in the scenarios where all data
(or the subset of most-accessed data) is largely below cache
capacity since all addresses can be potentially placed in the
same set.
Random Modulo placement (RM) groups the addresses shar-
ing the same memory page into cache segments and ensures
that all addresses from the same segment are mapped to
distinct sets. Randomization is achieved by using the random
number (changed across executions) and some address bits to
drive the permutation of index bits to the bits denoting the
set where to map the address. By avoiding conflicts among
consecutive memory addresses (those in the same page), RM
better exploits spatial locality in a similar manner as modulo
placement, and outperforms hRP in terms of both average
and worst-case performance. Note that RM requires that
page alignment does not change upon integration. Otherwise,
WCET estimates obtained under the assumption that some
contents reside in the same page (and hence cannot conflict
in cache), would be no longer valid if those contents move to
separate pages. Thus, RM improves performance w.r.t. hRP,
but also poses some additional constraints. RM preserves the
properties needed by MBPTA (independence of actual memory
addresses) as long as the page size is equal (or a multiple)
of the way size. If the page is smaller, then hRP must be
implemented instead of RM.
B. State-of-the-Art on CCP Detection
Cache placement plays a key role in the amount of conflict
misses experienced, becoming a central element for several
average- and worst-case cache optimization approaches [17],
[21], [30], [36]. These approaches, whose focus is on modulo
placement, build on deriving the number of cache conflicts
by either statically analyzing or profiling a program un-
der a heuristically determined subset of cache placements.
This information is later used to select the cache placement
(among those observed) that produces the minimum number
of conflicts. These approaches, however, build on the unlikely
assumption that a cache layout is robust against program
3For the sake of simplicity we assume that the addressable unit matches
the size of a cache line.
variations and incremental system integration, widely spread
in automotive and avionics among other domains. Our interest
in CCPs is not in finding an optimal one (which is indeed a
fragile concept) but rather in providing guarantees that relevant
CCPs are covered in the analysis test campaign.
The need to identify CCPs, and their probability of occur-
rence, in the scope of MBPTA was first shown in [2], which
propose a mechanism for hRP that determines the number of
measurements R to carry out as a function of the number of
program addresses and the probabilities that more than W of
them reside in the same set. Such approach assumes private
and partitioned caches, which are normally deployed in critical
real-time systems, for the sake of time-predictability. However,
the proposed approach is only suitable when all addresses
have a similar impact on execution time, while in general
access patterns and access counts across different addresses
are arbitrary.
ReVS [32] is a theoretical evaluation framework proposed
for hRP, but that can be adapted for all TRc. It builds on
Monte-Carlo simulations to explore the impact of a relatively
large set of random cache placements. From these simulations
the authors evaluate the miss impact in a cache simulator of
all potential CCPs. ReVS time overheads are unaffordable in
the general case as the number of cache placements to be
considered is a function of the number of different (unique)
addresses in the program: with address counts as small as
20 the number of simulations to perform already reaches
the order of billions, dismissing ReVS as a valid general
solution. Instead, ReVS can be used in controlled experiments
with reduced number of addresses, to assess the accuracy of
computationally-tractable techniques (as CCP-RM and CCP-
hRP) to capture CCP.
To the best of our knowledge, (1) no technique allows
deriving the minimum number of runs required for hRP with
affordable computational cost, and (2) no solution has been
proposed for higher-performance RM caches.
C. Difference between RM and hRP
RM and hRP cause CCP to be triggered differently, which
motivates having two different CCP detection techniques. As
an illustrative example, Figure 3 shows how 4 addresses could
be mapped to a 4-set cache in different runs. We see that, since
the addresses belong to the same memory page, they cannot
be mapped to the same set under RM and hence, cannot incur
CCP. Instead, with hRP every single address can be mapped
to any set, and possibly trigger CCP.
In order to better understand the differences between RM





















Each element is a memory address with the superscript
denoting the memory page (cache segment) it belongs to,
and the subscript the number of times that address has been
referenced. Further let us assume a 2-set direct-mapped cache.
With hRP, addresses have equal probability to be mapped to
Fig. 3. Small example for a 4-way hRP and RM cache. For RM the CCP
arises across different memory pages.
a set. The same holds for RM with the exception of addresses
belonging to the same memory page that are prevented from
colliding in the same set. Consequently, the set of possible
cache placements generated by RM is always a subset of
the possible cache placements by hRP. For Q0, Table II lists
all possible placements. As it can be seen, among all hRP
placements, only two can arise with RM.
TABLE II
CONFLICTIVE CACHE PLACEMENTS (CCP) FOR Q UNDER RM AND HRP
Placement hRP RM
{set0}{set1} or Misses CCP? Misses CCP?
{set1}{set0}
{ABCD} {-} 20 yes not possible
{AB} {CD} 20 yes not possible
{BCD} {A} 17 yes not possible
{ACD} {B} 17 yes not possible
{ABC} {D} 15 yes not possible
{ABD} {C} 15 yes not possible
{AC} {BD} 10 yes 10 yes
{AD} {BC} 10 yes 10 yes
hRP and RM produce different CCPs. hRP does not prevent
any addresses to coexist in a set, resulting in potential conflicts
among addresses in the same memory page. RM placement,
instead, avoids such behavior by design. Moreover, the CCPs
with RM, in general, produce lower miss counts compared to
those of hRP, as illustrated in Figure 4, reporting miss count
and frequency for the bitmnp EEMBC benchmark executed
in our reference setup (later presented in Section VI). RM
incurs similar miss counts as hRP only when addresses of the
sequence causing conflict misses belong to different memory
pages.
Fig. 4. bitmnp behavior in first level instruction hRP and RM caches.
IV. THE CCP-RM MECHANISM
CCP-RM derives the minimum number of runs needed to
ensure that all relevant cache events (i.e. CCP) have been
observed with sufficiently high probability for an RM cache.
For a given cache setup, CCP-RM analyzes the sequence of
memory accesses of the program (considering instruction and
data accesses separately). From these inputs, CCP-RM:
1) first creates a list of those address combinations that, if
placed in the same set, can result in high cache miss
counts (Section IV-A).
2) derives for each combination its impact in miss count
and probability of occurrence (Section IV-B).
3) assesses whether for a probability threshold 1 − Pcth
the number of runs typically required by MBPTA (R)
already captures these combinations and, otherwise, it-
eratively requests further runs (R′) until those combi-
nations are not observed with a maximum probability
below Pcth (Section IV-C).
CCP-RM is heuristic centric to make it computationally
tractable. Our results show that, in practice, the actual CCPs
are captured in the top 3 address combinations identified by
CCP-RM. Further, those address combinations classified as
the top ones by CCP-RM, but which do not correspond to the
actual CCP, have in fact, similar impact to the actual CCP.
A. Deriving Relevant Address Combinations
A necessary characteristic of CCP address combinations
is that their cardinality (i.e. number of addresses) exceeds
the number of cache ways W (e.g. for a 2-way cache, all
address combinations of 3 or more addresses are potentially
conflictive). CCP must also have a probability of occurrence
sufficiently high to be considered relevant by the correspond-
ing safety standard.
For each address count K > W , CCP-RM derives a list of
addresses (combinations) expected to generate many misses if
they are randomly mapped to the same set. CCP-RM focuses
on those combinations whose probability of occurrence is
above a safety-standard defined probability (e.g. 10−9). It stops
exploring K values when the probability that K addresses
are mapped to the same set falls below that threshold. Such
probability is analytically derived as (1/S)K−1, (C3:) the
multiplication of the number of available sets S and individual
probabilities to be mapped to the selected set 1/S, for each
of the K addresses). CCP-RM sets a maximum size (T ) for
the list of most relevant combinations to be considered for a
given value of K. As detailed later, those T combinations,
once evaluated, provide information of at least T address
combinations but, due to the way we select them, often
represent many more than T combinations.
Next, we describe how to produce the lists (for each value
of K). We accompany the explanation with examples in which
we assume a 2-way set-associative cache.
1) Guilt Estimation: We introduce an estimator (loosely
based on the probabilities of address misses) called guilt
that, for each address AX in a program, classifies the other
addresses with respect to how many evictions of AX they
will cause if randomly mapped to the same set. The guilt
attribute is later exploited to calculate the predicted impact of
a group of addresses, which in turn is used to rank the address
combinations based on the increase of the overall number of
cache misses caused by these addresses placed together in the
set. To estimate guilt, CCP-RM analyzes the access sequence
between consecutive accesses to the same address.
Notably, under RM only addresses belonging to different
segments can evict each other. Hence, CCP-RM ignores ad-
dresses belonging to the same segment. For example, in the
sequence Q1 = (A1001 , B1001 , C1001 , A1002 ), A1002 is necessarily
a hit, since all intermediate accesses, i.e. those between A1001
and A1002 , belong to the same segment.
Also with RM, addresses mapped to a set necessarily belong
to different segments. Therefore, an address can only conflict
with exactly one address from every other segment, but all
addresses from that segment are equally probable to conflict.
For example, in Q2 = (A1001 , B1021 , C1021 , A1002 ), addresses
B102 and C102 both can be mapped with the same probability
1/S to the same set as A100, but only one of them will
be actually mapped (i.e. either B102 or C102). Hence, the
number of addresses accessed in-between two accesses to the
considered address (A100) that can be placed in the same set
is at most the number of different cache segments accessed in
between, denoted by s.
For each memory access AXj , we define P̃guilty as the
likelihood of AX being evicted due to the conflicts with other
addresses, see Equation 1. Since in RM caches, conflicts can
only happen between addresses mapped to different cache
segments, s in Equation 1 represents the number of distinct
cache segments accessed in between two accesses (AXj−1 and










 0, if s<Ws, if W ≤s<KK−1, otherwise
(1)
The fraction W−1W represents the probability of a cache line
to survive an eviction, whereas m1 relates to the number of
evictions occurring. When s is smaller than W , the interme-
diate accesses would fit in a cache set, so misses may only be
produced due to random replacement, whose impact is already
captured with the default number of runs of MBPTA [2].
Hence, we assume that AXj hits, so the guilt of intermediate
accesses is 0. For values of s larger or equal to W , we assume
s evictions, but bounding that number up to K − 1 since we
inspect different address group cardinalities (K) iteratively and
for a given K value at most K−1 addresses can conflict with
the address in focus.
Equation 1 captures the case when the number of dis-
tinct segments accessed between AXj−1 and A
X
j is higher or
equal to W (i.e., s ≥ W ). Conflicts can also occur under
other address interleavings. For example, in the sequence
Q3 = (A1001 , B1011 , A1002 , C1021 , A1003 ), A1003 is likely to suffer
misses, even though the estimator would predict hits because
s < W . In this case, we may have misses because hits do
not alter cache state4 so that they can be stripped out of the
access sequence conceptually (e.g. A1002 )), thus making other
accesses (e.g. A1003 ) likely miss due to evictions caused by
B1011 and C
102
1 . To account for this, when deriving P̃guilty of
an access, CCP-RM searches for the previous access to the
same address with derived P̃guilty value higher than 0. The
access is predicted to hit only if s is strictly lower than W also
in the subsequence between those two accesses. Otherwise, the
access is considered a miss and the computed P̃guilty value
is distributed over the subsequence. In the example, A1001 is a
miss (the first access to an address is always a miss) and A1002
is a hit (s = 1 < W ). When assessing A1003 , CCP-RM searches
for previous accesses until reaching A1001 (A
100
2 is ignored as
it is predicted not to change cache state) and evaluate that
A1003 may miss since s = 2 ≥ W due to accesses B1011 and
C1021 .
2) The Guilt Table: Each eviction of an address in a
program under a conflictive placement, which occurs with
estimated probability P̃guilty, is caused by a set of addresses.
The share of responsibility of each of these addresses on
causing the eviction is quantified with their guilt value. While
guilt describes the pair-wise relation between addresses, the
predicted impact of the group of addresses will depend on the
relation between each pair of addresses in a group. Computed
guilt values are stored in the Guilt Table (GTAB), which is
later queried (either by inspecting exhaustively all possible
address combinations or a subset of them as proposed in
Section IV-A3) to derive predicted impacts of address groups.
The GTAB is organized as a matrix. For each address
Aseg(A) in a program, the GTAB keeps track of:
• The overall likelihood of that address to miss
due to conflicting with other addresses under CCP
(GTAB[Aseg(A)].P̃guilty). It is to the accumulated
P̃guilty values of each access to address Aseg(A).
• The overall guilt of each other address on poten-
tial evictions of address Aseg(A). For instance, cell
GTAB[Aseg(A)].guilt[Bseg(B)] keeps guilt values of
address Bseg(B) w.r.t. misses of all accesses to address
Aseg(A) during the execution of the program.
To populate GTAB, CCP-RM iterates through the sequence
of memory accesses and computes their P̃guilty value. If for a
given access to address Aseg(A)i P̃guilty 6= 0, then this value is
added to GTAB[Aseg(A)].P̃guilty and distributed among the
different segments in-between Aseg(A)i and the previous access
to Aseg(A), i.e. Aseg(A)i−1 , as shown in Equation 2, using m1
value computed in Equation 1. Then, the guilt assigned to a
segment is added on top of the GTAB[Aseg(A)].guilt of each
intermediate accessed address that belongs to that segment.
This is done because each address in a given segment can be
placed in the same set as the analyzed address with identical
probability. For example, let us consider the access A1002 in the
sequence Q4 = {A1001 , B1021 , C1001 , D1031 , B1022 , E1021 , A1002 },
4This assumption holds for TRc (the scope of this work) which deploy
random replacement policy.
with W=2 and the group cardinality K=3. The number of
distinct cache segments accessed after A1001 is s=2 (segments
102 and 103). Those segments together with segment 100






= 0.75 and add it to GTAB[A100].P̃guilty.
Next, we distribute 0.75 across s = 2 segments, such that
Pguilt−seg =
0.75
2 = 0.375. The guilt of all addresses be-
longing to segments 102 and 103 (GTAB[A100].guilt[B102],
GTAB[A100].guilt[D103] and GTAB[A100].guilt[E102]) is





, if m1 > 0
0, otherwise
(2)
A GTAB is derived for each cardinality K and is later
inspected to compute the predicted impact of address com-
binations. This is done in two steps:
First, for each address A in the combination under analysis,
we sort all the other addresses in the combination by their guilt
on A, and take the value on the W th position and keep it as
MA. The reason is that address A needs to conflict with at least
W addresses to exceed the cache set space and such scenario
cannot occur more times than the number of conflicts between
address A and the least conflictive address with A among W
of them. In the example in Table III, we observe high guilt
values between addresses B102 and D103, but not among the
rest of addresses. This happens when those two addresses are
interleaved together with other addresses that do not interleave
systematically with these ones. In the table, guilt.xxx stands
for the guilt values for other addresses omitted in the example
for clarity.
And second, the predicted impact of an address combination
is computed by applying the harmonic mean of all MA
values of addresses in a combination so to give lower rank
to combinations with low MA values, which reflects that A
cannot have many conflicts if one of the other addresses cannot
create many conflicts. Instead, CCP-RM seeks address groups
in which conflicts occur due to the interaction among all of
them. If a conflictive behavior occurs because of the interaction
of a subset of these addresses, such combination is already
accounted by CCP-RM for lower K values. For instance, in
Table III the predicted impact of the combination [A100, B102,
D103, F 104] equals the harmonic-mean5 of 20.0, 30.0, 28.0
and 15.0, which is 21.54.
3) Generation of Address Combinations: To derive a list
of the conflictive combinations, CCP-RM builds a GTAB for
each K value. Next, it generates possible combinations of K
addresses and derives their impact as previously described.
Ideally, CCP-RM would inspect all possible combinations
(discarding the ones in which addresses from the same seg-
ment repeat). However, the number of combinations grows
exponentially with the number of addresses. Therefore, CCP-
RM adopts an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) to optimize this
5The harmonic mean is a good estimator due to its sensitivity to lower
values, giving lower ranking to combinations in which at least one address is
not conflicting with others. Average mean, however, promotes combinations
with only a subset of addresses conflicting.
TABLE III
RELEVANT FIELDS OF GTAB TO DERIVE PREDICTED IMPACT OF AN
ADDRESS COMBINATION [A100 , B102 , D103 , F 104].
Pguilty guilt.B guilt.D guilt.F guilt.A guilt.xxx MX
B102 550.0 0.0 150.0 20.0 15.0 365.0 20.0
D103 400.0 145.0 0.0 30.0 10.0 215.0 30.0
F 104 250.0 16.0 28.0 0.0 30.0 176.0 28.0
A100 235.0 15.0 5.0 30.0 0.0 185.0 15.0
search by generating the subset of all possible combinations
of addresses expected to be the most conflictive ones.
Rows in GTAB are sorted by their overall P̃guilty value. For
each row, e.g. that for address Aseg(A), the algorithm generates
combinations of K addresses, containing Aseg(A), belonging
to addresses (rows) not yet inspected, i.e. with lower P̃guilty.
The search stops when P̃guilty of a row address is below 1%
of the highest P̃guilty in the table (lines 6-8), since potential
combinations could only consist of low impact addresses (each
below the 1% threshold).
In each iteration, the algorithm considers the potential
conflictive addresses with Aseg(A) (lines 9-15). It excludes
all addresses belonging to the same segment and those whose
guilt value on the row address w.r.t. the total guilt on that
address is below the defined significance threshold Sth (1%
in our case). Next, the remaining addresses are grouped by
the segment they belong to into Segs, to account for the fact
that only one address from each group can belong to the same
combination. Our search derives all the possible ways to select
K − 1 addresses from Segs groups (lines 17-18).
Then we need to explore conflicts against all the segments
in each combination (lines 22-35). In order to explore all
addresses of any given segment in Segs, we take into account
their individual guilt on the address addr with which we
are generating combinations, and only consider one address
representative (with the highest overall P̃guilty value) for
those that have the same GTAB[addr].guilt value, since their
impact will be identical. When computing the probability of
those combinations (lines 36-40), we account for the number
of combinations that could be produced with addresses in
that group (due to several of them having identical guilt
value) to multiply the probability of having just one address.
Considering a combination touching 3 segments: having 2
addresses with identical guilt value in a first segment, 3 in
a second one, and 3 in the other, will lead to 18 potential
combinations with exactly one address from each segment.
Such probability is specifically computed in line 37. Still,
multiplying probabilities without considering that combina-
tions may overlap (the latter would diminishing the overall
combined probability) leads to some pessimism. As shown
later, this could only lead to requesting more runs than strictly
required, thus not diminishing the confidence of the method.
On the other side, addresses from the same Segs group, but
with different guilt values, are considered individually.
Illustrative example. Next, we show the generation of
combinations of size K = 3 in one iteration. We inspect
the row containing address A100 and the set of potentially
Algorithm 1 Generation of Address Combinations
1: Input: K . number of addresses in a combination;
GTAB . address Guilt Table derived for K;
S . number of cache sets;
2: Output: List of <combination; prob.> pairs;
List of predicted impacts for each element in
pairs listPI;
3: sort GTAB row-wise by P̃guilty;
4: N ← nrows(GTAB);
5: for addr ← 1:N do







10: addrSpace ← [ ];
11: for m ← (addr+1):N do





16: <combination; probability> pairs ← [ ];
17: Segs ← list distinct segments in addrSpace;
18: combsSeg ← list all combinations of (K-1) segments
from Segs;
19: for all cs: cs ∈ combsSeg do
20: listA ← [ ];
21: cntA ← [ ];
22: for seg ← cs[1]:cs[K-1] do
23: listA[seg] ← [ ];
24: cntA[seg] ← [ ];
25: for all g: distinct guilt values in seg do
26: listTmp ← [ ];
27: for all a: a ∈ seg do




32: listA[seg].add(address with the highest
P̃guilty in listTmp);




36: for all combinations < a1, a2,...,ak−1, addr>:
aj ∈ listA[j], where j=1,...,K-1 do






38: pairs.add(<< a1, a2,...,ak−1, addr>; prob>);
39: listPI.add(predicted impact of




conflictive addresses [E102,C103,B102,D103] with their corre-
sponding values of guilt on A100: [15, 15, 15, 20] and P̃guilty:
[72.5, 62.5, 58.75, 30.375], as illustrated in Table IV.
Addresses are grouped in Segs 102 and 103. The only way
to make a combination of K − 1 addresses is to select one
address from each segment. Segs 102 contains two addresses
with identical guilt value, thus it returns the address with
TABLE IV
THE RELEVANT FIELDS OF GTAB TO GENERATE COMBINATIONS OF
ADDRESSES CONTAINING ADDRESS A100
Seg 100 Seg 102 Seg 103
Pguilty guilt.A guilt.B guilt.E guilt.C guilt.D





higher P̃guilty, which is E102 and marks that two addresses
share this behavior. Segs 103 returns addresses C103 and D103
since they have different guilt value. If p is the probability
that three addresses are mapped to the same set, then the
step will result in the next <combination; probability> pairs:
[A100,E102,C103; 2p] and [A100,E102,D103; 2p]. Here 2p is
the probability of combining the 2 addresses in segment 102
with the specific address in segment 103.
Finally, the address combination search returns the list of
those T <combination; probability> pairs with the highest
predicted impact in listPI , where the list is derived as shown
in lines 36-40 of Algorithm 1 and predicted impact computed
as described in Section IV-A2 (see example in Table III).
While these combinations are expected to produce the highest
impact in terms of number of misses when placed in the same
set, their actual impact needs to be determined since guilt
and P̃guilty are estimators that are used just to rank address
combinations.
While we simplified Algorithm 1 for the sake of readability,
its implementation can be further optimised, which we did in
our experiments. We recommend the recursive implementation
to generate combinations (line 18). Finding distinct segments
of addresses (line 17) can be done while iterating through
addresses (lines 11 and 12) by storing segments into a structure
with non-repeated values (e.g. a set). listA and cntA (lines
22-34) can be created in line 13, where the user does not
need to keep all the addresses with the same guilt, but only
K with the highest P̃guilty value. For efficient searching of
relevant data we recommend the use of map structures (instead
of lists/arrays).
B. Impact and Probability Calculation
The algorithm from the previous step derives a list of
<combination, probability> pairs, describing representative
address combinations and the probability of observing them
or any other with the same predicted impact. The impact in
terms of miss count of each representative address combination
is evaluated with a cache simulator. The addresses in the com-
bination are mapped to the same set, while others are randomly
mapped. Several Monte-Carlo simulations are performed and
the impact of the given combination is determined as the
average impact across the different Monte-Carlo simulations.
Next we map <combination, probability> pairs into the
<probability, misscount> domain by ordering the pairs per
derived impact, and computing the combined probability and
impact for the first pair, first two pairs, first three pairs, and
so on, until we cover all pairs in the list. Given a number
of first N address combinations, the combined miss count
(having one of them) is their average miss count, and the
combined probability is the union of their probabilities. Since
their individual probabilities do not have to be necessarily
disjoint, to determine the exact joint probability one would
need to determine the overlaps between all groups of 2, 3,...,N
combinations. However, to avoid the inherent computational
complexity of such activity, similar to the previous step, we
upperbound such probability as the addition of their probabil-
ities, which is generally a tight upperbound. The individual
probabilities of all combinations of K addresses are identical,
so determining the joint probability becomes trivial.
C. Assessment Against the pWCMC Curve
Previous steps result in a pair <probability, misscount>
for each CCP , i.e. combination and group of combinations
deemed as conflictive. As next step, we generate a probabilistic
worst-case miss-count (pWCMC) by applying Extreme Value
Theory to the miss counts in a sample of R randomly
generated RM mappings. We check whether the pWCMC
distribution upperbounds all CCP (i.e their miss count). If
this is the case, the default number of measurements R used
by MBPTA suffices to derive trustworthy WCET estimates.
Otherwise, more runs are performed, until pWCMC upper-
bounds all pairs. The obtained number of runs R′ is finally
returned as the number of runs to be collected by the end user.
For instance, in Figure 5, the solid curve is the pWCMC
estimate and the black squares and crosses the miss counts ob-
tained for all CCP whose probability of occurrence is above
Prel. Black circles are those CCP below Prel and hence,
are not considered. Black squares are those CCP whose miss
count is covered by the pWCMC, while the miss counts of the
CCP marked with crosses are not. In this example scenario,
CCP-RM requires the user to increase the number of runs from
R to R′ such that the impact of those combinations (black
crosses) is properly upperbounded. We also observe that when
increasing the number of runs to R′ runs (with R′>R) the
resulting pWCMC curve captures the impact of all relevant
combinations (black squares and crosses). Overall, this results
in an increased number of runs R′ for which the obtained
pWCMC estimate reliably upperbounds the miss count of all
combinations and therefore, the pWCET estimate obtained
with R′ runs also upperbounds their timing impact.
D. Miss Count - Execution Time correlation
It could be the case that the pWCMC curve upperbounds
CCP systematically with the default number of runs R. This
can occur either because R is sufficient to capture all CCP, or
simply because the impact of CCP is lower than that of other
jres. In the latter case, as shown in [2], other jres are expected
to occur with a sufficiently high probability to be captured with
the default number of runs of MBPTA. However, in general,
miss counts have a relevant impact (if not the highest impact)
on execution time amongst the existing jres, and so techniques
Fig. 5. Illustrative application of CCP-RM and CCP-hRP.
TABLE V
PEARSON AND SPEARMAN COEFFICIENTS FOR NormMiss AND
NormET .
CCP-hRP CCP-RM
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman
a2time 0.997 0.992 0.976 0.970
aifftr 0.918 0.911 0.969 0.960
aifirf 0.960 0.956 0.988 0.986
aiifft 0.923 0.913 0.960 0.952
basefp 0.999 0.998 0.952 0.933
bitmnp 0.998 0.998 0.975 0.960
cacheb 1.000 0.970 0.992 0.988
idctrn 0.950 0.951 0.969 0.973
iirflt 0.997 0.979 0.977 0.997
like CCP-RM are needed. Whether execution time correlates
with miss counts has already been proven in many platforms.
In our particular case, we have quantitatively assessed the
correlation between miss counts and execution time in our
FPGA platform, whose specific setup is shown in Section VII.
To that end we used Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. The
former measures the linear dependence between two variables,
while the latter measures the statistical dependence between
two variables by assessing to what extent those variables
can be modeled using a monotonic function. The outcome
of both methods is a value o ∈ [−1, 1]. For o= 1 there is
total positive correlation; for o = 0 no correlation is found;
and for o=−1 total negative correlation i reported. In our
experiments we use a 5% significance level (a typical value
for this type of tests [19]). We used normalised values for
qualitative assessment, where we plotted normalised values
of execution times/misses and compared the trends by visual
inspection. Table V shows that all EEMBC benchmarks result
in high values of correlation coefficients by both methods
confirming that miss counts and execution times are highly
linearly correlated, for both RM and hRP (presented in next
Section). The lower o values occur for benchmarks with low
miss count variations. Thus, other sources of jitter, like those
introduced by the store buffer, have a relatively higher impact
than for other benchmarks.
V. THE CCP-HRP MECHANISM
CCP-hRP is analogous to CCP-RM but with some critical
differences due to the different behaviour of hRP and RM.
A. Deriving Relevant Address Combinations
As in the case of CCP-RM, CCP-hRP produces, for each
K > W address count, a list of address combinations that, if
placed in the same set, produce high miss counts. Note that,
similar to CCP-RM, only T combinations are kept. To build
those lists, CCP-hRM builds upon the address Guilt Table
(GTAB), but P̃guilty and so guilt are computed differently
to the case of RM caches.
First, P̃guilty is obtained as described in Equation 3. While
the formulation is analogous to that of CCP-RM (see Equa-
tion 1), there is a key difference. In the case of RM caches, m1
is set based on the number of different segments (s) accessed
in between two consecutive accesses to a given cache line. In
the case of hRP caches, m2 is set based on the number of







 0, if q<Wq, if W ≤q<KK−1, otherwise (3)







2 we would have s=1, but q=2. This
reflects the fact that for hRP caches, A100, B102 and C102 can
compete for the space in the same set, whereas for RM caches
B102 and C102 can never be placed in the same set.
1) Guilt estimation: When for an access Ai P̃guilty 6= 0, its





i−1 . Each accessed address is assigned a guilt
value w.r.t. address Aseg(A) computed as shown in Equation 4,
using P̃guilty and m2 as described in Equation 3. Note that
in this case guilt considers cache line addresses individually





, if m2 > 0
0, otherwise
(4)
For example, let us recall the previous example for
CCP-RM and consider the access A1002 in the sequence
{A1001 , B1021 , C1001 , D1031 , B1022 , E1021 , A1002 }, W = 2 and the
group cardinality K = 3. The number of distinct addresses
accessed after A1001 is q = 4. Those addresses together with
A100 exceed the cache associativity. Since q ≥ K, we compute





= 0.75 using m2 = K − 1 = 2.
We distribute this to q = 4 addresses, such that guilt =
0.75
2 = 0.375. Guilt of all addresses in between (B
102, C1001 ,
D103 and E102) is then increased by 0.375. Note that the
addition of guilt assigned to intermediate accesses is bigger
than P̃guilty. The idea is that for K = 3, CCP-hRP (and CCP-
RM) constructs 3-address combinations that in this case can
be any of ABC, ABD, ACD, BCD, ABE, ACE, etc. In
all those containing A, we want to assign one half of the guilt
to each of the two intermediate accesses. That is, for ABC
one half of the guilt is assigned to B and another half to C.
At any moment only K − 1 accesses will be simultaneously
considered by CCP-hRP, so the guilt of a given access is not
decreased because of having other intermediate accesses (more
than K). As the value of K increases – as part of CCP-hRP
iterative process – those other intermediate accesses will be
considered simultaneously.
2) The Guilt Table: In the case of CCP-hRM, the GTAB
has the same characteristics as for CCP-RM: as many rows
and columns as different (cache line) addresses are accessed
in the program to store guilt values and one additional column
to track P̃guilty values. Cell GTAB[A].guilt[B] captures the
guilt of B on A, that is, a measure of to what extent misses of
every access Ai are caused by any access to Bj . The GTAB
is built for every value of K. From the GTAB we infer
information about the impact that each address has on the
evictions of each other address. However, that the actual values
in each cell of GTAB differ between CCP-hRP and CCP-RM,
since they operate on different formulations for P̃guilty and
guilt.
3) Generation of Address Combinations: The approach to
generate address combinations from GTAB is very similar to
that of CCP-RM, but with some key differences. For instance,
when considering conflictive addresses with the address of the
corresponding row, we only consider those addresses whose
relative impact w.r.t. the total guilt in the row is significant for
the address of that row. Such significance threshold Sth is 1%
as for CCP-RM. Note that whether addresses belong to the
same or different segments is irrelevant for CCP-hRP, since
addresses can be randomly placed in the same set regardless
of their segment. In Algorithm 1, the condition from line 12
becomes redundant.
We group addresses into buckets in each row of the GTAB,
grouping all the addresses with the same guilt value w.r.t.
the address of that row. The objective, as explained next,
is limiting the number of address combinations that need to
be considered. In case this originates too many buckets, thus
ending up requiring high computation time, then the grouping
criterion can be tweaked to tolerate small differences between
guilt values of addresses in the same bucket, as a means to
reduce their total count. In Algorithm 1, buckets correspond to
the listTmp, with a different bucket created for each distinct
guilt value in addrSpace (not per segment), and listTmp are
global variables.
Then, we generate the combinations of K elements for each
row by making all possible combinations with the address
corresponding to that row and K − 1 elements from different
buckets (and modify line 36 in the algorithm accordingly).
For instance, assuming K = 4 and 2 buckets (b1 and b2),
we make all combinations of 4 addresses using the one of
the row and three addresses from the buckets: 3 from b1, 2
from b1 plus 1 from b2, 1 from b1 plus 2 from b2, and 3
from b2. We always choose those addresses with the highest
P̃guilty in each bucket. We take into account the size of the
bucket by computing how many combinations are expected to
have the same impact of the representative ones. For instance,
if b1 and b2 contain 4 and 5 addresses respectively, when
picking 2 addresses from b1 and 1 from b2, we determine that
there are 30 different combinations meeting those constraints.
This is used to set the probability of the pair <probability,
misscount> if these combinations have a sufficiently high
impact to deserve to be explored by simulation (line 37 of
Algorithm 1). The probability equals to the probability of
an individual address combination, S ∗ (1/S)K , times the
number of different combinations that can be produced with
the addresses of a bucket.
B. Impact and Probability Calculation
When all addresses have been analyzed and the list with
T = 20 combinations6 for a particular value of K is obtained,
we perform cache simulations to determine their miss counts.
In the case of addresses in a bucket, we simulate only those
with the highest P̃guilty and assume the same impact for other
combinations that could be generated with other addresses in
the bucket. While this may lead to a little pessimism in terms
of the impact of those addresses, such pessimism is very lim-
ited given that addresses belong to the same bucket. This may
result in pairs <probability, misscount> further challenging
the reliability of the pWCMC curve, thus potentially rejecting
some very tight (yet reliable) pWCMC estimates.
The approach to determine the probability of each combi-
nation is analogous to that of CCP-RM: S × (1/S)K for a
single combination. For the combined probability (when the
number of combinations represented by the one in the list is
more than one), we pessimistically use the addition of their
individual probabilities as for CCP-RM.
C. Assessment Against the pWCMC Curve
As for CCP-RM, CCP-hRP uses MBPTA on the miss counts
obtained from cache simulations in which all addresses are
randomly mapped, as it would occur in reality, to obtain
a probabilistic worst-case miss-count (pWCMC) curve. The
number of simulations, R, is determined by MBPTA.
VI. EVIDENCE FOR CERTIFICATION
The mechanisms we propose to identify and capture CCPs
are meant to enhance the reliability of MBPTA results, with
a view to meeting the reliability requirements of the V&V of
embedded critical systems. Not surprisingly, both techniques
feature a heuristic search over the CCP space: a reasoned
heuristic-based empirical evidence is de-facto the only means
to analyze overly-complex hardware and software systems,
where providing exhaustive evidence is generally untenable.
This section aims at showing that CCP-RM/hRP can con-
cretely improve the reliability of MBPTA. We do so by
conducting a three-fold assessment.
1) We show that the implemented heuristics are accurate
by comparing their outcome with that of ReVS [32],
which is known to provide exact results by exhaustively
exploring the impact of all address combinations with
cardinalities higher than cache associativity. Since the
cost of ReVS is prohibitive for real-size programs (hence
the need for a heuristic), we stick to a controlled scenario
as explained next.
6One combination may be the representative of others if addresses belong
to buckets. Hence, simulating 20 combinations provides information of, at
least, 20 actual address combinations, but generally many more than 20.
2) We show the effectiveness of CCP-RM/hRP in detecting
otherwise ignored CCPs, and the impact this has on the
overall number of runs CCP-RM/hRP require to use
(R′) as compared to the default number of runs used
by MBPTA (R).
3) We show that the benefits of CCP-RM/hRP come with
affordable computational requirements.
Note that, in our case, the implication of using a heuristic is
that the CCP impact computed by CCP-RM/hRP may slightly
differ from that computed by the exact method. However,
our algorithms do not focus on a single CPP but on a list
thereof, and the list of CCPs considered by the heuristics
is always including the topmost (highest-impact) CCPs. For
the benchmarks evaluated in this section and case study (next
section) we consider the topmost 20 CCPs (i.e., T =20), which
in practice results in considering already more combinations
strictly required, as confirmed by the results. We inspect
combinations of cardinalities K in the range W+1 ≤ K ≤ 13
(probabilities of address combinations of higher cardinalities
are negligible).
A. Experimental Setup
We use EEMBC Autobench benchmark suite [37], represen-
tative of some real-time automotive applications. On average
EEMBC Automotive benchmarks comprise 6,500 Lines of
Code, where the average number of distinct addresses is 2,500
for instructions and 5,600 for data. We use a simulation
environment based on the cycle-accurate SoCLib [41] frame-
work. We model an architecture featuring a pipelined in-order
processor with separated instruction (IL1) and write-back data
(DL1) caches, both deploying random replacement, and RM
or hRP policies. Access latencies for IL1 and DL1 are 1 cycle
for hits and 4 cycles for misses, which sums up to memory
latency, for a total of 20 cycles.
B. CCP-RM/hRP Accuracy
ReVS [32] precisely identifies all conflictive cache place-
ments, by exhaustively exploring (measuring) the impact
of all possible address combinations rather than predicting
their impact, as done by CCP-RM/hRP. Thus, ReVS is used
as a reference to assess the accuracy of CCP-RM/hRP in
identifying CCPs based on heuristics. As different address
combinations can cause similar miss impact, we are not
comparing individual address combinations and, instead, we
compare the computed <probability, misscount> pairs. The
comparison is conducted both (i) visually, by plotting pairs
as in Figure 6 (we restrict to the cacheb benchmark for
space constraints), and (ii) analytically, considering the size
of the sample required to upper bound those pairs (shown
in Tables VI and VII). To fairly compare the sample size
needed to upper bound pairs and discard the variation due
to the convergence criteria, we analyze the same measurement
samples with both CCP-RM/hRP and ReVS methods. The cost
of ReVS is however prohibitive for real-size programs, so for
the sake of comparison only, we focus on a controlled scenario
with a small number of addresses, which was obtained by
creating synthetic benchmarks accessing the 15 most-accessed
cache lines from each EEMBC Automotive benchmark.
This limitation on the number of addresses makes that the
number of accessed pages reduces to 1 or 2 cache segments for
most benchmarks, making that no CCP exist for RM in most
of the cases. Hence, only for this controlled scenario and RM,
we use a small cache (512B 32B/line 2-ways IL1/DL1), such
that even programs with small address footprints can exhibit
a conflictive behaviour. Note that with hRP 15 addresses
can easily exceed cache associativity. In the case of hRP
reducing cache size would further increase the probability of
CCP, which would easily make the default number of runs of
MBPTA sufficient, so no insight would be shown if cache size
was decreased, as done for RM. Therefore in the controlled
scenario we use a 4KB 32B/line 2-way IL1 and DL1 cache
setup.
TABLE VI





ReVS CCP-RM ReVS CCP-RM ReVS CCP-RM
a2time 1,460 1,460 8,650 8,650 8,650 8,650
aifftr 480 480 670 670 670 670
aifirf 6,300 6,300 300 300 6,300 6,300
aiifft 410 410 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500
basefp 420 420 300 300 420 420
bitmnp 370 370 3,570 3,570 3,570 3,570
cacheb 300 300 690 690 690 690
idctrn 300 300 300 300 300 300
iirflt 300 300 300 300 300 300
Table VI reports the minimum number of measurements
(R′) deemed sufficient for a reliable application of MBPTA
according to CCP-RM and ReVS for IL1 and DL1. The final
number of runs required for each technique is the maximum of
both (IL1 and DL1). The accuracy of CCP-RM is confirmed
by the fact that in all cases it computes the same values as
ReVS. In general, this is expected since CCP-RM successfully
identifies the critical combinations, whereas ReVS necessarily
identifies them due to its brute force nature. Hence, by
applying the same requirements on the pWCMC with both
methods and using the same measurement sample, MBPTA
converges with the same number of runs. In particular, when
CCP-RM identifies that conflictive placement can occur, it
returns the same address combinations that are top-ranked
by ReVS, or with a very close miss-impact. For the IL1,
for six benchmarks (ia2time, iaifftr, iaifirf,
ibitmnp, icanrdr, iidctrn) CCP-RM does not re-
turn any conflictive address combination: this is explained by
the fact that in those cases all address combinations returned
by ReVS are already upper-bounded with the default number
of measurements by MBPTA. For other benchmarks CCP-RM
also returns no address combinations as potentially conflictive
for high cardinalities of K, while ReVS does. This may
happen when the conflictive impact is actually caused by
address groups smaller than K that are instead considered by
CCP-RM.
Fig. 6. pWCMC for cacheb and a DL1 RM cache.
For instance, Figure 6 shows that, although conflictive
placements – referred to as address combinations – can occur
with cardinalities K = 4 and K = 5, as recognized by ReVS,
those placements are upper bounded by the truly conflictive
placement of combinations with cardinality K = 3.
Table VII shows the number of runs that each of the
methods regards as the minimum to use for a reliable MBPTA
application according to CCP-hRM and ReVS. We show
results for both IL1 and DL1. As shown, both approaches
provide exactly the same number of runs (R′) for these limited
address traces. In particular, CCP-hRM identifies the same ad-
dress combinations most of the times or, alternatively, address
combinations with roughly the same impact as those regarded
by ReVS as the most conflictive ones for each value of K.
The exception to this comes from the case in which ReVS
identifies for high values of K combinations which, in fact,
are the addition of two or more independent combinations.
For instance, ReVS identifies combinations for K = 6 that, in
reality correspond to two combinations of K = 3 occurring at
the same time. As explained before, EVT needs to observe
high-impact events, but not their combination. Thus, this
difference has no influence on R′.
TABLE VII





ReVS CCP-hRP ReVS CCP-hRP ReVS CCP-hRP
a2time 58,360 58,360 540 540 58,360 58,360
aifftr 6,840 6,840 5,500 5,500 6,840 6,840
aifirf 21,390 21,390 11,530 11,530 21,390 21,390
aiifft 8,920 8,920 8,770 8,770 8,920 8,920
basefp 82,080 82,080 20,010 20,010 82,080 82,080
bitmnp 4,640 4,640 3,510 3,510 4,640 4,640
cacheb 18,610 18,610 7,950 7,950 18,610 18,610
idctrn 65,770 65,770 47,700 47,700 65,770 65,770
iirflt 18,310 18,310 49,760 49,760 49,760 49,760
Despite using different setups, CCP-RM requires fewer runs
than CCP-hRP. This occurs because CCP for RM (if any) can
only occur with few addresses because there are few cache
segments. Therefore, the probability to capture those CCP is
relatively high and few runs suffice in general. Conversely,
with hRP it is often the case that CCP involve more addresses
than those for RM. Therefore, their probability of occurrence is
lower and thus, a larger number of runs is required to guarantee
that they are effectively captured.
C. Evaluation of CCP-RM and CCP-hRP Effectiveness
With the purpose of entailing an increase in the number
of conflicts and hence, further stressing CCP-RM/hRP, in
this section we evaluate CCP-RM/hRP for a relatively small
cache 4KB 32B/line 2-ways IL1 and DL1 cache. We also
focus on full-size EEMBC benchmarks to assess whether our
methods effectively improve MBPTA reliability by identifying
potentially unobserved CCP. To that end, we compare the
number of measurements required by a default application of
MBPTA (R) against those required by CCP-RM/hRP (R′), for
a set of EEMBC benchmarks. Note that for this experiment
using all addresses, ReVS could not be used due to its
exponential execution time requirements with the number of
benchmarks’ number of unique addresses.
TABLE VIII





′ lhood(R′) R lhood(R)
a2time 300 730 730 10−9 300 2.00 ∗ 10−4
aifftr 300 6,160 6,160 10−9 300 3.64 ∗ 10−1
aifirf 470 22,490 22,490 10−9 370 7.11 ∗ 10−1
aiifft 300 110,000 110,000 10−9 74,600 7.88 ∗ 10−7
basefp 320 1,120 1,120 10−9 960 1.93 ∗ 10−8
bitmnp 300 310 310 10−9 300 1.95 ∗ 10−9
cacheb 460 390 460 10−9 500 < 10−9
idctrn 350 1,050 1,050 10−9 500 5.18 ∗ 10−5
iirflt 300 930 930 10−9 320 8.00 ∗ 10−4
For CCP-RM Table VIII reports different values of R and
R′. Only for one benchmark (cacheb) the default MBPTA
application asks for more runs than those actually needed
to observe conflictive placements. In this case, 460 runs
suffice for MBPTA to converge in the cache miss domain,
but few more runs are needed in the execution time domain
to have enough high execution time values to converge due
to variations across random samples. For the remaining eight
benchmarks, collecting R measurements results in a probabil-
ity of not capturing CCP for RM higher than the established
threshold, see lhood(R) column. In fact, for two benchmarks
(aifftr, iirflt) we observe that the EVT projection using
R does not upperbound the ECCDF applied on an arbitrarily
large number of runs, which is actually upperbounded when
the pWCET is estimated using R′ runs as determined by CCP-
RM. Figure 7 reports the results for one of those benchmarks,
aifftr.
In Figure 7(a) the pWCMC estimate derived with R runs
and R′ is plotted against the conflictive sets of addresses
(from 3 to 7 addresses) found by CCP-RM for DL1. As it
can be observed, for the default R the pWCMC does not
cover all relevant address combinations, while with the CCP-
RM-provided R′ the resulting pWCMC does upperbound all
conflictive address combinations.
In the time domain we take as term of comparison the
Empirical Complementary CDF (ECCDF) derived from four
(a) pWCMC estimate with R and R′ runs
(b) pWCET estimate with R and R′ runs
Fig. 7. EVT projections for benchmark aifftr with RM caches
million execution times we collected. Figure 7(b) shows that
the pWCET curve obtained from R runs does not upperbound
the ECCDF. The pWCET obtained with R′ runs returned by
CCP-RM, instead, upperbounds the ECCDF.
Analogous results are reported in Table IX for CCP-hRP. As
shown, R′ ≥ R: in many cases we observe that the likelihood
of missing critical address combinations in the default runs
(R) determined by MBPTA only is high. This does not mean
that pWCET estimates are necessarily wrong, but indicates
that there is non-negligible risk of not observing some high-
impact timing events in the analysis runs if CCP-hRP is not
used.
When comparing the number of runs of CCP-hRP with
full address traces w.r.t. only 15 addresses, we observe in
most of the cases a limited variation in R′. However, in
some cases R′ decreases noticeably (e.g., R′IL1 for aifftr)
because there are many combinations with similar impact
that cannot be observed with only 15 addresses. This makes
that the probability of observing one of those combinations
is much higher and thus, fewer runs are needed to observe
one of them. In any case, differently to ReVS, which is
limited to 15 addresses, CCP-hRP can deal with arbitrary
access patterns without any explicit limit. Thus, CCP-hRP
removes the uncertainty brought by ReVS due to non-analyzed
addresses.
D. CCP-RM and CCP-hRP Time Requirements
The main execution time requirement of CCP-RM, CCP-
hRP, and ReVS comes from the cache simulations (Sec-
tion IV-B). In order to run the simulations, we used a cluster
running 100 jobs in parallel. For the controlled scenario, CCP-
RM and CCP-hRP require 1 and 11 minutes respectively







′ lhood(R′) R lhood(R)
a2time 67,150 300 67,150 10−9 300 9.11 ∗ 10−1
aifftr 300 4,760 4,760 10−9 300 2.71 ∗ 10−1
aifirf 20,080 8,090 20,080 10−9 14,260 4.06 ∗ 10−7
aiifft 300 10,630 10,630 10−9 300 5.57 ∗ 10−1
basefp 78,220 300 78,220 10−9 1,250 7.18 ∗ 10−1
bitmnp 330 1,800 1,800 10−9 300 3.16 ∗ 10−2
cacheb 19,840 1,500 19,840 10−9 9,360 5.69 ∗ 10−5
idctrn 67,460 43,040 67,460 10−9 300 9.12 ∗ 10−1
iirflt 29,920 2,430 29,920 10−9 300 8.12 ∗ 10−1
spent in deriving conflictive placements respectively. ReVS,
due to its complete exploration approach, required 2 and 27
hours for RM and hRP cache setups respectively. With full
benchmarks, CCP-RM and CCP-hRP require on-average 18
and 38 minutes per benchmark respectively out of which
2.5 and 1 min on average are spent to calculate conflictive
placements respectively. ReVS simulations would take years
to be executed. Our results show that CCP-RM and CCP-hRP
result in affordable execution time requirements.
VII. RAILWAY CASE STUDY ON FPGA
We also evaluate CCP-RM/hRP with a real industrial case
study from the railway domain, running on a LEON3 FPGA
board modified to support RM and hRP caches.
Instruction and data addresses are collected with the stan-
dard debug interface (DSU) support present in our FPGA
board. Notably, other processor architectures provide similar
or more advanced tracing features, e.g. the Nexus Interface
for NXP processors and Coresight for ARM processors. Since
address tracing can affect execution time, time traces are
collected only with the address tracing mechanism disabled.
Address traces are collected in a single separate run, for which
timing is not considered. Obtained data and instruction traces
can be used to perform CCP-RM/hRP analysis and random-
cache simulations since cache-set mapping is now independent
from the address.
The railway application implements a safety function from
the European Train Control System (ETCS) reference archi-
tecture. The analysed application controls the execution of all
safety functions associated to the travelling speed and distance
supervision. This safety function is provided with the highest
integrity level defined in the railway safety standards, SIL-4,
and has strict real-time requirements. The end user provided
us input vectors that exercise 10 different paths (TEST0 to
TEST9). The case study comprises around 8,500 lines of
code, 2,994 unique instruction addresses and 597 unique data
addresses for the largest input set.
A. Experimental Results
The case study was executed by the end user on the FPGA
(following the exact specifications of the FPGA setup). Both
first level caches are 16KB 4-way, with 32B cache line size
for instructions and 16B for data.
TABLE X
CCP-RM AND CCP-HRM RESULTS ON THE RAILWAY CASE STUDY.








TEST0 1,560 300 1,560 300 300 1,300 1,300 370
TEST1 300 410 410 300 600 3,800 3,800 3,800
TEST2 300 340 340 300 600 1,000 1,000 300
TEST3 350 300 350 300 1,600 850 1,600 300
TEST4 — — 300 300 1,200 1,100 1,200 750
TEST5 10,300 300 10,300 300 2,100 900 2,100 480
TEST6 — 3,200 3,200 300 500 890 890 890
TEST7 1,240 300 1,240 300 500 4,400 4,400 300
TEST8 — — 300 300 700 2,300 2,300 300
TEST9 — 300 300 300 4,800 1,740 4,800 1,740
CCP-RM. Table X (left) reports the number of runs identi-
fied by CCP-RM (R′) for IL1, DL1 and globally, against the
default number required by MBPTA for convergence (R). Both
R and R′ measurements suffice to upper bound all CCP in the
RM setup. Since the number of segments for each benchmark
is generally low (between 4 and 13), conflictive behaviour can
occur only for combinations of addresses of low cardinality,
which are more likely to be observed already with a moderate
number of runs. For data traces of two benchmarks (TEST8
and TEST9), the number of segments does not exceed cache
associativity. For data trace of TEST2 and instruction traces
of groups of benchmarks (TEST0, TEST1, TEST2, TEST3,
TEST5, TEST6, TEST7 and TEST9) the method does not
identify any CCP: despite CCP can be theoretically had, as
the number of segments exceeds associativity, the addresses
from distinct segments are barely interleaved, hence CCP-RM
attaches small guilt values. For data traces of (TEST0, TEST1,
TEST3, TEST5, TEST7), the method identifies relevant com-
binations at most for a single K value (5 in all cases apart
from TEST5 with 6). However, each of them are already upper
bounded by the number of runs required by a default MBPTA
application, 10,300 at most. Further, by comparing the EVT
projection with the actual impact (ECCDF projection over
10 million observed miss counts), we observed that pWCMC
estimates are very close to actual values.
CCP-hRP. Table X (right) reports the results we obtained,
in terms of the number of runs that MBPTA and CCP-hRP
require in the miss domain for the hRP setup. As it can
be seen, the default application of MBPTA failed to upper-
bound some address combinations for data or instructions for
many input sets. Furthermore, in those cases where R < R′
confidence on having enough runs for a reliable application of
MBPTA cannot be had. This is shown in Figure 8 for TEST7
and the DL1 where CCP-hRP <probability, misscount> pairs
(points in the plot) are not upper-bounded by the pWCMC
curve (lower straight line in the plot) when using R = 300,
as determined by MBPTA. Instead, if we use R′ = 4, 400, as
determined by CCP-hRP, the pWCMC curve properly upper-
bounds those pairs.
Fig. 8. pWCMC for TEST7 (DL1) by applying MBPTA (R) and CCP-
hRP+MBPTA (R’).
B. CCP-RM/hRP Execution Time Requirements
CCP-RM took less than 0.5s per input vector to identify
conflictive placements and less than 5s on average for cache
simulations. CCP-hRP, instead required 1.3 minutes per input
vector to derive the conflictive combinations and 20 seconds
per input vector for cache simulations. As expected, the cost
on the hRP setup is a bit higher than on the RM setup due to
the increased number of CCPs in the former since addresses
in the same segment may potentially collide.
VIII. RELATED WORK
While several approaches exist for attacking the WCET
estimation problem [44], we focus here on related work on
MBPTA. MBPTA deals with jres by either enforcing some
hardware components to always operate in their worst-case
mode (upperbounding) or by injecting time randomization in
those components exhibiting larger variability. The realization
of the above concepts led to the notion of MBPTA-compliant
hardware, as formalized in [15], which has been later imple-
mented either by low-overhead modifications in the hardware
design of resources like caches [27] or buses [15], or by
resorting to lightweight software means to obtain the same
effects of randomization, as it has been done in the case of
deterministic caches [26].
A time-randomized cache, deploying hRP placement, was
firstly introduced in [27]. Its improved version, RM, has been
proposed in [22]. Previous work observed that, in certain
scenarios, TRc can lower the confidence had on WCET
estimates [2], [31], [39]. A detection mechanism for such
scenarios and ways to account for them in the analysis have
been proposed for hRP cache designs and programs in which
accesses to memory are homogeneously distributed [2], and for
programs with arbitrary access patterns but extremely limited
size [32].
Several studies focus on properly handling control-flow
and data dependencies [28], [45] and controlling execution
time dependence on input-data [13]. Other works considered
the application of EVT or other probabilistic techniques to
programs running on deterministic (non-randomized) archi-
tectures [4], [10], [13], [20]. In that scenario, however, the
lack of randomization (and upperbounding) necessarily leads
to extremely fragile results in terms of representativeness of
the different jres, including caches.
Statistical aspects of MBPTA are addressed in [40], focusing
attention on EVT parameter selection and [3], [13], [35],
the tail distribution to better describe WCET estimates. Other
works apply MBPTA in multicore systems where shared
hardware resources are MBPTA-compliant [43] or contention
impact is upperbounded [9]. The open challenges for MBPTA
application are explored in [25].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We propose CCP-RM and CCP-hRP, two conflictive-
placement detection mechanisms for high-performance TRc
deploying RM and hRP placement respectively. CCP-RM/hRP
identify the cache conflictive placements that result in high
execution times. We exploit this information to derive the
minimum number of measurements R′ to be performed so that
the probability of missing the impact of those cache conflictive
placements is below a configurable threshold (e.g. 10−9).
The adoption of CCP-RM/hRP guarantees a cache-conflictive
placement aware, reliable application of MBPTA. Our results
using benchmarks and a real case study, respectively run on
a simulator and a real board deploying RM and hRP caches,
show the effectiveness of CCP-RM/hRP in identifying cache
conflict placements and deriving an appropriate value for R′.
Moreover, we show that the cost of applying CCP-RM is lower
than that of CCP-hRP due to the reduced number of CCP that
can occur in RM caches w.r.t. those in hRP ones.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has received funding from the Spanish Ministry
of Science and Innovation under grant TIN2015-65316-P and
the HiPEAC Network of Excellence. The Ministry of Econ-
omy and Competitiveness partially supported Suzana Miluti-
novic under FPI grant (BES-2016-077561), Jaume Abella un-
der Ramon y Cajal postdoctoral fellowship (RYC-2013-14717)
and Enrico Mezzetti under Juan de la Cierva-Incorporación
postdoctoral fellowship (IJCI-2016-27396).
REFERENCES
[1] ARM Expects Vehicle Compute Performance to Increase 100x
in Next Decade. Technical report, https://www.arm.com/
about/newsroom/arm-expects-vehicle-compute-performance-to-\
increase-100x-in-next-decade.php, 2015.
[2] J. Abella et al. Heart of Gold: Making the improbable happen to extend
coverage in probabilistic timing analysis. In ECRTS, 2014.
[3] J. Abella et al. Measurement-based worst-case execution time estimation
using the coefficient of variation. ACM TODAES., 2017.
[4] G. Bernat and M. Newby. Probabilistic WCET analysis, an approach
using copulas. Journal of Embedded Computing, 2006.
[5] Certification Authorities Software Team. Multi-core Processors - Posi-
tion Paper. Technical report, CAST-32A, November 2016.
[6] Cobham Gaisler. LEON3 Processor (Probabilistic platform). http://
www.gaisler.com/index.php/products/processors/leon3.
[7] F. Corno et al. Gatto: a genetic algorithm for automatic test pattern
generation for large synchronous sequential circuits. IEEE Trans. on
CAD of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 1996.
[8] L. Cucu-Grosjean et al. Measurement-based probabilistic timing analysis
for multi-path programs. In ECRTS, 2012.
[9] E. Diaz et al. MC2: Multicore and cache analysis via deterministic and
probabilistic jitter bounding. In Ada Europe, 2017.
[10] S. Edgar and A. Burns. Statistical analysis of WCET for scheduling. In
the 22nd IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS01), 2001.
[11] A. Blin et al. Maximizing Parallelism without Exploding Deadlines in
a Mixed Criticality Embedded System. In ECRTS, 2016.
[12] E. Mezzetti et al. A rapid cache-aware procedure positioning optimiza-
tion to favor incremental development. In RTAS, 2013.
[13] George Lima et al. Extreme value theory for estimating task execution
time bounds: A careful look. In 28th ECRTS, 2016.
[14] J. Nowotsch et al. Multi-core interference-sensitive WCET analysis
leveraging runtime resource capacity enforcement. In ECRTS, 2014.
[15] L. Kosmidis et al. Fitting processor architectures for measurement-based
probabilistic timing analysis. Microprocessors and Microsystems, 47:287
– 302, 2016.
[16] Michael H. Schulz et al. Socrates: a highly efficient automatic test
pattern generation system. IEEE Transactions on CAD of Integrated
Circuits and Systems, 7(1):126–137, 1988.
[17] H. Falk and H. Kotthaus. Wcet-driven cache-aware code positioning. In
Proc. of CASES, 2011.
[18] G. Fernandez et al. Computing safe contention bounds for multicore re-
sources with round-robin and FIFO arbitration. IEEE Trans. Computers,
66(4), 2017.
[19] R.A. Fisher. The arrangement of field experiments. Journal of the
Ministry of Agriculture of Great Britain, pages 503 – 513, 1926.
[20] J. Hansen et al. Statistical-based WCET estimation and validation. In
WCET Analysis workshop, 2009.
[21] A. et al. Hashemi. Efficient procedure mapping using cache line
coloring. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 1997.
[22] C. Hernandez et al. Random modulo: a new processor cache design for
real-time critical systems. In DAC, 2016.
[23] E. Heymann. The digital car. more revenue, more competition, more
cooperation. Technical report, Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt am
Main Germany, July 2017.
[24] International Organization for Standardization. ISO/DIS 26262. Road
Vehicles – Functional Safety, 2009.
[25] S. Jimenez et al. Open challenges for probabilistic measurement-based
worst-case execution time. IEEE ESL, 2017.
[26] L. Kosmidis et al. Probabilistic timing analysis on conventional cache
designs. In DATE, 2013.
[27] L. Kosmidis et al. Efficient cache designs for probabilistically analysable
real-time systems. IEEE Trans. Computers, 2014.
[28] L. Kosmidis et al. PUB: Path upper-bounding for measurement-based
probabilistic timing analysis. In ECRTS, 2014.
[29] S. Kotz et al. Extreme value distributions: theory and applications.
World Scientific, 2000.
[30] P. Lokuciejewski, H. Falk, and P. Marwedel. WCET-driven Cache-based
Procedure Positioning Optimizations. In Proc. of the 20th Euromicro
Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS), 2008.
[31] E. Mezzetti et al. Randomized caches can be pretty useful to hard
real-time systems. LITES, 2(1), 2015.
[32] S. Milutinovic et al. Modelling probabilistic cache representativeness in
the presence of arbitrary access patterns. In ISORC, 2016.
[33] S. Milutinovic et al. Software time reliability in the presence of cache
memories. In Ada-Europe, 2017.
[34] T. Mitra, J. Teich, and L. Thiele. Time-critical systems design: A survey.
IEEE Design &‘ Test, 35(2), 2018.
[35] K. Palma et al. On using gev or gumbel models when applying evt for
probabilistic wcet estimation. In RTSS, 2017.
[36] K. Pettis and R. C. Hansen. Profile guided code positioning. ACM
SIGPLAN Notices, 25(6):16–27, 1990.
[37] J. Poovey. Characterization of the EEMBC Benchmark Suite. North
Carolina State University, 2007.
[38] S. Quinton. Industrial panel: Multicore architectures in the automotive
industry: Existing solutions, current problems and future challenges.
http://2017.rtss.org/industrial-panel/.
[39] J. Reineke. Randomized caches considered harmful in hard real-time
systems. LITES, 1(1), 2014.
[40] L. Santinelli et al. Revising measurement-based probabilistic timing
analysis. In RTAS, 2017.
[41] SoCLib. -, 2003-2012. http://www.soclib.fr/trac/dev.
[42] Z. Stephenson et al. Supporting industrial use of probabilistic timing
analysis with explicit argumentation. In INDIN, 2013.
[43] F. Wartel et al. Timing analysis of an avionics case study on complex
hardware/software platforms. In DATE, 2015.
[44] Wilhelm R. et al. The worst-case execution-time problem overview of
methods and survey of tools. ACM TECS, 7:1–53, May 2008.
[45] M. Ziccardi et al. EPC: extended path coverage for measurement-based
probabilistic timing analysis. In RTSS, 2015.
